The long-run infl ation expectations of consumers, as measured by the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers ("UM survey"), have been on a steady downward trend since the third quarter of 2014.
The decline in expectations began at about the same time as a sharp drop in gasoline prices, and many have drawn a connection between these movements. But we fi nd that explanation incomplete at best and consider whether a decline in infl ation uncertainty is also playing a role. Answering this question involves looking at the individual responses of consumers in the UM survey and making a few calculations: First, following Binder (2016a) , we deduce the probability that each respondent is highly uncertain; we then estimate overall uncertainty, and sort respondents into two groups, highly uncertain or not highly uncertain. Second, we calculate the infl ation forecasts of each group over time, and third, we estimate the separate contributions of each group's forecast and that of uncertainty to the overall infl ation forecast.
We fi nd that uncertainty has declined since 2014, and this decline can explain part of the drop in infl ation expectations since then. However, we also fi nd that uncertainty has actually been falling since 2012; but in between then and now, infl ation forecasts of both groups rose and then fell back. Our decomposition indicates that from 2012:H1 to 2014:H1, the effect of declining uncertainty-which by itself reduces infl ation expectations-was more than offset by an increase in the infl ation expectations of both types of consumer. Since each group's expectations are back to where they were in 2012, the entire drop in average expectations since 2012 is explained by a decline in uncertainty.
Blame Oil?
The downward trend in the long-run infl ation expectations of consumers appears to start at more or less the same time as a sharp fall-off in oil and gasoline prices in the summer of 2014, as shown in fi gure 1. 4 In June of 2014, the average price of a gallon of gasoline in the United States was $3.78, but by January 2015 it had fallen to $2.13. Median longerrun infl ation expectations were 2.9 percent in July 2014, but have been hovering near 2.6 percent since October 2015.
Many economists believe that these two variables are closely related. Historically, there is some evidence that increases (or decreases) in gasoline prices have been associated with increases (or decreases) in consumers' infl ation expectations. Higgins and Verbrugge (2015) and others 5 fi nd that long-run consumer infl ation expectations are meaningfully infl uenced by large gasoline price movements.
6 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) assert that consumers' one-year-ahead infl ation expectations exhibit a "strong sensitivity" to the level of oil prices. These fi ndings suggest that the decline in gasoline prices may be a key driver behind the decline in consumers' long-run infl ation expectations over the last two years.
However, assigning too much blame to gasoline prices seems premature, for two reasons. First, the strength of the correlation between gasoline prices and long-run expectations has historically been low. Regression coeffi cients imply that, on average, a gasoline price change of 10 percent in one month has historically only increased median infl ation expectations by 0.03 percentage points. Putting this differently, a gasoline price movement of 42 percent-a number that is close to the cumulative change in gasoline prices experienced over the recent period-will, on average, shift infl ation expectations by a mere 0.12 percent. 7 In that sense, gasoline prices can explain only about one-third of the decline in longer-run infl ation expectations over this period. Other evidence suggests there are many infl uences on infl ation expectations, which often dominate the infl uence of gasoline. 8 Second, while gasoline prices fell a lot over this period, they also exhibited two upward surges, and neither appeared to boost infl ation expectations.
9
Blame a Reduction in Infl ation Uncertainty? To shed some further light on long-run infl ation expectations, we dig into the UM survey microdata, the infl ation forecasts given by individual respondents each month. Studying these responses allows us to construct a measure of infl ation forecast uncertainty.
In the UM survey, individual consumers' forecasts of infl ation are reported in integers. There is substantial heterogeneity in these forecasts. Some consumers report forecasts reasonably close to the Federal Open Market Committee's 2 percent target, while others report seemingly extreme forecasts, like 15 percent infl ation over the longer run. 10 We fi rst look at the "popularity" of various integer responses appearing in the survey, and the degree to which the popularity of various responses has changed over time. We compare three periods: an earlier period (1998-2012:H1) , an intermediate six-month period (2014:H1), and the most recent six-month period (2016:M2-M7). The 2014:H1 time period was selected as a focus, and as the appropriate comparison to the most recent period, because expected infl ation began to decline in July 2014. For the earlier period, we opted to include only data through 2012:H1 because after this point, uncertainty started falling and in 2013:H1, the expectations of each group started to rise. The popularityof-response information is depicted in fi gure 2, which plots three histograms, each one a "snapshot" representing the distribution of responses during each of the three periods.
The histogram for the 1998-2012:H1 period shows a high degree of dispersion in expected infl ation, with some respondents reporting very low infl ation forecasts such as -3 percent, and others reporting very high forecasts such as 15 percent. A key feature of the histogram is the "heaping" of respondents at multiples of 5 percent. For example, about 16 percent of all survey respondents chose 5 percent as their infl ation forecast during this period; by contrast, only about 7 percent of respondents chose a forecast of 4 percent, and 2 percent chose a forecast of 6 percent. Looking at the entire histogram, it is clear that 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, and -5 percent stick out as "unusually high" compared to adjacent numbers.
These histograms give us one lens through which to view the evolution of individual consumers' infl ation forecasts. As one moves from the early period to the 2014:H1 period, the most notable changes in the pattern of responses are that both the 0 percent and 5 percent responses become less common, and the 1 percent, 2 percent, and 3 percent responses become more common. Moving from the 2014:H1 period to the current period, the most notable changes are that the 1 percent and 2 percent responses become more common, while the 3 percent, 4 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent responses become less common. Of these, the most striking change is the increase in the popularity of the 1 percent response (from 18 percent in 2014:H1 to 24 percent in the last six months).
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What can we make of the unusual "heaping" pattern of responses and of these shifts? Binder (2016a) respondents have a tendency to report "round number" responses when they are very uncertain. This tendency is documented over a variety of contexts in the cognition, communication, and fi nance literatures. In the UM survey data, the nature and prevalence of responses like 5 or 10 indicate that these are "round number" responses, and Binder (2016a) applies this insight to construct a monthly infl ation uncertainty index based upon the pattern of such responses. 12 Roughly speaking, the overall level of infl ation uncertainty corresponds to the percentage of respondents who are highly uncertain, i.e., the percentage of respondents who report a round number. 13 Notice that since most highly uncertain responses are 5 percent or above, high uncertainty tends to be correlated with high infl ation expectations. Figure 3 plots the evolution of the uncertainty index over time, along with gasoline prices. In contrast to the histograms in fi gure 3, the uncertainty index is a monthly measure, whose timeliness allows us to detect turning points and trends in the level of uncertainty. Figure 3 indicates that a steady decline in uncertainty began shortly after 2012:H1, several years prior to the large decline in gasoline prices. The decline in long-run infl ation uncertainty may partly refl ect improvement in general macroeconomic conditions, since this uncertainty measure (in keeping with other uncertainty measures 14 ) is generally countercyclical. A distinct decline in longer-run infl ation uncertainty begins not long after the FOMC's January 2012 announcement of an explicit 2 percent target for PCE infl ation. It is conceivable that this communication could have contributed to a stronger anchoring of expectations around the target, reducing longer-run infl ation uncertainty, though causality would be diffi cult to demonstrate.
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Can changes in infl ation uncertainty help explain the recent downward trend in long-run infl ation expectations? This certainly seems plausible. As noted above, highly uncertain responses are often very high responses, generally much higher than accurate forecasts. Hence, when long-run infl ation uncertainty declines, the average infl ation expectation tends to fall.
However, the reduction in uncertainty cannot fully explain the post-mid-2014 decline in infl ation expectations either. The larger part of the decline in infl ation uncertainty actually predates this recent decline in infl ation expectations. Infl ation uncertainty fell substantially after 2012:H1 but has only dropped modestly since 2014:H1. Indeed, the fact that infl ation uncertainty and infl ation expectations are correlated immediately brings another question to the fore: Why didn't infl ation expectations decline over the earlier period (2012:H2-2014:H1) when infl ation uncertainty was steadily falling?
Infl ation Expectations by Type
To help answer these questions, we split respondents into two groups, or types of respondents. For each month, we use the tools in Binder (2016a) to partition the UM survey sample into the highly uncertain respondents and the less uncertain respondents, and we compute the average infl ation forecast of each type. 16 The evolution of these two infl ation forecasts enables us to distinguish the effect of declining uncertainty per se-the effect of a reduction in the percentage of highly uncertain consumers in the population-from changes in the actual infl ation forecasts of the members of each type. We plot 3-month moving averages of these two variables in fi gure 4, along with vertical lines denoting January 2012 (FOMC announcement of the 2 percent target) and July 2014 (onset of decline in average infl ation expectations).
As one might expect, the infl ation expectations of the highly uncertain type are quite volatile: Month-to-month changes are large, as are the sweeping trends that occur over a period of several years. By contrast, the infl ation expectations of the less uncertain consumers are far more stable. 17 uncertainty fell between July 2012 and June 2014 was that the effect of the decline in uncertainty was more than offset by an increase in the infl ation expectations of both types.
Figure 4 also suggests an explanation for the recent decline in infl ation expectations. The expectations of both types of respondent have fallen since mid-2014, but the sharper falloff for the highly uncertain is not unusual and the current forecast is well within historic norms. In contrast, the downward trend in infl ation expectations of the less uncertain is more diffi cult to dismiss as noise: If we look at two-year windows since 2000, the changes witnessed over this period are in the 85th percentile in terms of magnitude. Still, those expectations are back to where they were in 2012.
We can mathematically decompose the drop in the average infl ation forecast into three parts: the parts due to the reduction in the expectations of each type of respondent, and the part due to a shift in the relative proportion of the two types (i.e., the part due to the decline in uncertainty). 18 Since the fi rst half of 2014, the average long-run forecast across all consumers fell by 0.62 percentage point (ppt.). 19 The average forecast of the highly uncertain type fell by about 2 ppt., but the contribution of this change to the overall average forecast was only -0.18 ppt., owing to the small (8.15 percent) average proportion of the highly uncertain over this time period. The average forecast of the less uncertain fell by 0.35 ppt., and the contribution of this change in forecasts to the overall average forecast was -0.32 ppt. The remainder, -0.14 ppt., is due to a reduction in uncertainty over this period.
20 Thus, this decomposition suggests that just over half of the recent decline in long-run infl ation expectations is attributable to declining infl ation expectations among less uncertain consumers, while slightly less than one-quarter of the decline resulted from the reduction in uncertainty over this period.
However, suppose we ask a different question. Since the latter part of 2012, average longer-run infl ation expectations have dropped by 0.34 percentage points. 21 What explains this change? The answer: Nearly all of this change results from a decline in uncertainty. This follows from the fact that the infl ation forecasts of both types of consumer are, roughly speaking, back to where they were in 2012:H2. (The forecasts of the high-uncertainty type are essentially the same as in 2012:H2, while the forecasts of the low-uncertainty type have risen only slightly.) Hence, the 0.34 ppt. decline in the average forecast since 2012 must derive almost entirely from a change in the relative proportion of types, namely the decline in the proportion of highly uncertain consumers in the economy.
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Conclusion
Consumer infl ation expectations have recently declined. While many analysts blame oil, we note that this explanation falls short. A decline in infl ation uncertainty can also potentially explain a drop in average infl ation expectations. Highly uncertain consumers have historically reported relatively high roundnumber infl ation forecasts, so a decline in the proportion of highly uncertain respondents tends to reduce average forecasts.
We fi nd evidence of a signifi cant drop in infl ation uncertainty since 2012. But because the level of infl ation uncertainty has not declined very much since mid-2014, the change in uncertainty cannot explain much of the decline in infl ation expectations since that time.
However, we gain considerable insight by comparing the actual average infl ation expectations of highly uncertain consumers with those of less uncertain consumers. We observe that the infl ation expectations of both types have declined, but the expectations of both types are presently at levels comparable to those in early 2012. From this fact, we are able to conclude that the 0.34 ppt. drop in average consumer long-run infl ation expectations since 2012 derives entirely from a decline in the proportion of highly uncertain consumers. Putting this differently, the drop in the longer-run infl ation expectations of consumers since 2012 derives entirely from a decline in their uncertainty about future infl ation. 2. See, e.g., Bernanke 2010 , Simon et al. 2013 , or Ball and Mazumder 2014 3. Alternative measures of infl ation expectations, such as the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia's Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland's infl ation expectations measure, refl ect the expectations of professional forecasters and fi nancial market participants. Conversely, the UM survey refl ects the expectations of households, thought to be an important driver of infl ation dynamics (see, e.g., Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015) .
4. Formal statistical tests, such as the Quandt-Andrews (Andrews 1993) or Andrews-Ploberger (Andrews and Ploberger 1994) tests, identify the oil-price break in August 2014 but identify an infl ation-expectations break several months earlier. Still, the eyeball metric suggests that infl ation expectations did not decline in earnest until about the same time.
5. Trehan (2011) and Neely (2015) also fi nd that infl ation expectations are highly responsive to energy prices.
6. Cao and Shapiro (2016) argue that the decline in energy prices can explain about three-fourths of the 0.2 ppt. decline in professional 10-year infl ation forecasts over the past fi ve years.
7. Indeed, Higgins and Verbrugge (2015) note that the quantitative infl uence of energy prices on infl ation expectations is "generally quite modest." The estimated size of the expectation responses in that study are very close to those above. Binder (2016b) uses both reduced-form and structural methods to study the infl uence of gasoline prices on consumer infl ation expectations. That study concludes that consumers do not overweight gas-price changes in their perception of overall infl ation, and that movements in gasoline prices have a moderate effect on short-run infl ation expectations, which rapidly declines with forecast horizon; consumers evidently believe that gas prices are mean-reverting. The effect on 5-to-10-year infl ation expectations is almost negligible. 8. A number of other factors are believed to infl uence infl ation expectations, such as demographic characteristics (see, e.g., Souleles 2004), education and economic literacy (see, e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al. 2010 or Meyer and Venkatu 2011) , the actual infl ation experiences of consumers (see, e.g., Malmendier and Nagel 2016), consumer attitudes (see, e.g., Ehrmann et al. 2015) , and media exposure (see, e.g., Carroll 2003).
9. Another reason that the recent downward trend in infl ation expectations may be puzzling is that, since the beginning of 2015, one measure of the trend in infl ation-based on the median CPI-has been increasing (see fi gure 1), and historically, median CPI infl ation has been positively correlated with long-run infl ation expectations. The median CPI is one of the best available estimates of trend infl ation, outperforming so-called "core" infl ation measures on both theoretical and empirical grounds. See, e.g., Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) , Smith (2004) , Meyer et al. (2013) , or Higgins and Verbrugge (2015b) .
10. Some of the dispersion in infl ation forecasts may refl ect similar dispersion in the infl ation experiences of households; see Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2016) . Below, we discuss another interpretation of extreme forecasts.
11. The popularity of the 1 percent response (and, to a lesser extent, the 2 percent response) has grown steadily since 2009. 12. Consumer expected infl ation uncertainty is often estimated using the interquartile range of survey responses. But the interquartile range is more properly associated with consumer disagreement-dispersion of beliefs across consumers-rather than uncertainty-how confi dent a person is that her forecast is correct. See Orlik and Veldkamp (2012) for some related discussion.
13. This is not the whole story, since some of those respondents are not uncertain at all but just happen to report such a number. Fortunately, statistical procedures allow one to estimate the probability that any given respondent is relatively uncertain or uninformed, given the entire distribution of responses in a given month. For details, see Binder (2016a) . For updated data on Binder's infl ation uncertainty index, see https://sites.google.com/site/infl ationuncertainty/.
14. See, for example, Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) .
15. For a broader look at the effectiveness of Federal Reserve communication with the public at large, see Binder (2016c) .
16. In the UM survey, each month approximately 40 percent of the respondents have been surveyed once previously, six months ago, while the remaining respondents are being given the survey for the fi rst time. As survey participants are selected randomly from the population, the fraction of highly uncertain respondents in the sample will approximate the fraction of highly uncertain consumers in the population at large.
17. It turns out that these expectations are also more reliably related to future infl ation; see Binder (2015) .
18. See the online appendix for an explanation of how we did this decomposition.
19. In our mathematical decompositions, we focus on average infl ation expectations for simplicity. To ensure that our results are not infl uenced by noise in the sample, we compute changes in six-month averages.
20. Shares do not add exactly to 0.62 due to rounding. 21. Over this period, median longer-run infl ation expectations dropped by 0.2 percentage points.
22. More specifi cally, changes in the expectations of highly uncertain respondents contributed +0.04 ppt. to the decline, while changes in the expectations of the less uncertain respondents contributed -0.01 ppt. Thus, changes in uncertainty contributed -0.37 ppt.
